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EPILOGUE
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION EXTENDED To THEATER PRODUCTIONS
Unlike film directors, stage directors traditionally have not been given copy-
right protection for their contributions to live theater productions. However, due
in part to a 1992 ruling by the U.S. Copyright Office, stage directors are now
claiming the right to their own intellectual property contributions. The 1992
ruling involved a stage director who had an express grant of copyright from the
producer, as well as a videotape of the production. These two factors were per-
suasive in the ruling because the videotape reduced the production to a fixed and
tangible medium of expression - a requirement for copyright protection. The
Copyright Office held that the stage production was eligible for copyright protec-
tion, thus recognizing the artistic talent of stage directors - recognition that was
long-overdue.
While traditionally stage directors and choreographers received credit for their
input, they did not receive protection under "work for hire" contracts. In contrast,
directors in the film industry have long been able to obtain copyrights for their
artistic input. For example, they have obtained protection for where actors should
stand, how loud they should speak and where the spotlight should focus. Because
stage directors must supply the same creative input in their productions, it made
little sense to award protection to one group and not the other.
Today's contracts and collective bargaining agreements reflect the 1992 Copy-
right Office ruling that stage directors are able to retain copyright ownership of
their input. Furthermore, in 1995, director Gerald Gutierrez successfully settled a
lawsuit involving a 1994 Chicago version of his 1992 Broadway show "The
Most Happy Fella." Gutierrez argued that his artistic innovations in the Broad-
way revival of the production had been appropriated without consent, royalties or
credit. Despite this trend, few stage directors have actually sought copyright
protection. As one lawyer put it, "[a] huge tree fell in the copyright world, but
no one was around to hear it." Richard C. Reuben, New Clout for Stage Direc-
tors: Copyright Protection Available For Creative Work, 81 Oct. A.B.A. J. 32
(1995).
Kathryn Michaelis
THE MuPPET v. SPAM CONTROVERSY
Hormel Foods Corporation, the manufacturer of the "world's leading loaf of
compressed pork shoulder and ham," has filed suit against Jim Henson Produc-
tions. The Hormel product, Spam, is a gelatin-coated pork product that has been
on the market since 1937. Spam's popularity grew during World War HI when
used by the Armed Forces. Today, Hormel sells approximately 100 million cans
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of Spam worldwide each year.
The suit, filed in the summer of 1995, alleged that a character in the upcom-
ing muppet movie, Muppet Treasure Island, infringed on Hormel's trademark.
The muppet, whose name is "Spa'am," is the leader of a tribe of wild boars that
take Miss Piggy and other muppets captive. Hormel described the muppet as a
"grotesque and noxious-appearing wild boar" that would prompt unfavorable
associations with their food product.
In addition to dilution of trademark arguments, Hormel also argued that
Henson Productions was developing a multinational merchandising program in
competition with their Spam items. Henson Productions plans to market Spa'am
on McDonald's Happy Meal boxes, Cheerio's cereal boxes, and in television
commercials. However, Hormel produces Spam T-shirts, golf balls, and other
items, and even has its own mascot by the name of "Spam-Man." Henson Pro-
ductions defended on the grounds that the muppet was a humorous take-off on
the actual product.
On September 22, 1995, the U.S. District Court for Southern District of New
York ruled in favor of Henson Productions, stating that Henson has a right to
parody. The court stated that "Hormel cannot use federal trademark laws to
enjoin what is obviously a joke at its expense." The court further noted that there
was no likelihood of confusion between the character and the lunch meat.
Hormel is appealing on the grounds of confusion and unfair competition. The
Muppet movie is to be released in February of 1996. Mark Caro, Spam vs.
Spa'am, CmH. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1995, § 5, at 1; Frederick M. Winship, Judge Rules
In Favor of Muppet Boar, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 25, 1995.
Kathryn Michaelis
IRS TIGHTENS GRIP ON HOLLYWOOD DEDUCTIONS
In a July 26, 1995 statement, the IRS spoke out strongly against many tax
deductions favored by entertainers. While the statement, embodied in the IRS
"Market Segment Specialization Program Examination Technique Guide," is not
codified law, it does represent IRS policy. The implication is that failure to fol-
low the guidelines may not constitute an outright violation, but it may prompt an
unwanted audit. Unfavored deductions are contained in the following categories:
(1)Expenses For Maintaining The Image. Among the deductions that may lose
their validity are physical fitness expense deductions. The IRS would allow them
only to the extent that they are linked to the specific requirements of a taxpayer's
work. Thus, an actor who obtains a role in a Kung Fu movie and must learn
karate may deduct the expenses for karate lessons. However, expenses for per-
sonal trainers to help a performer keep in shape allegedly for better job appeal
would not be deductible.
(2)Personal Appearance v. Business Necessity. Currently, medical expenses are
deductible only to the extent they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income. Ho-
wever, medical deductions for cosmetic surgery, toupees, false teeth and hearing
aids are generally not allowed. Most of these expenses are seen as merely "im-
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proving the patient's appearance" and not as business-related. Yet, one exception
to this general rule has been noted where a stripper was allowed to deduct the
expense of breast implants because she proved that her compensation increased
dramatically as a result of the implants. Also note that wardrobe costumes are
not deductible if they are suitable for general wear or use away from work.
(3)Miscellaneous Deductions. Other formerly accepted deductions that now will
be curtailed include expenses for bodyguards and security systems, tickets to
movies and theaters and cable TV subscriptions. Except in cases where there is a
direct correlation to the entertainer's business, such as tickets to Romeo and
Juliet to prepare for an upcoming role, the IRS views most miscellaneous deduc-
tions as personal and non-deductible.
(4)Loanout Corporations. The IRS has also renewed its attack on deductions
taken by professional athletes and entertainers for the use of loanout corpora-
tions. Loanout corporations provide tax benefits such as the ability to take deduc-
tions without limitations applicable to normal employee business expenses, the
ability to obtain certain pension benefits that would otherwise be unavailable to
employees, and advantageous medical reimbursement plans and insurance bene-
fits. (See Leavell v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 140 (1995)). The IRS guide sug-
gests a number of ways to attack these loanout corporations. While none of the
suggestions are new, they do indicate an intention on the part of the IRS to con-
tinue to pursue this area. Robert M. Jason, IRS Issues Examination Guide Attack-
ing Industry Deductions; Tightening the Belt, 10 ENT. L. & FIN. No. 6, at 1
(1995).
Kathryn Michaelis
STATES' ATrEMFrs To RESTRIr COPYRIGHT ROYALTY COLLECTION ARE
HALTED
On April 27, 1995, Governor Whitman of New Jersey vetoed New Jersey
Assembly Bill 1610. That bill aimed to prevent copyright owners and their
agents from engaging in arbitrary and capricious enforcement practices in their
attempts to collect copyright royalties from various institutions. Among these
institutions are restaurants, sport facilities and other business locations that pub-
licly perform copyrighted material. The bill is similar to the Fairness in Musical
Licensing Act of 1995 introduced into the House on February 1, 1995.
The major performing rights societies, primarily BMI and ASCAP, applauded
the veto. Spokespersons for both organizations viewed the bill as threatening the
livelihood of music writers and publishers, as well as imposing burdensome
reporting requirements. Governor Whitman allegedly vetoed the bill because it
unconstitutionally interfered with the rights of copyright owners. The veto may
also have been a response to pressure from both ASCAP and BMI.
The New Jersey veto is indicative of legislation in other states, including
pending bills in California, Florida, Illinois Maryland and Missouri. Fifteen other
1995]
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states have defeated or stalled similar bills. NJ. Governor Vetoes Bill Restricting
Copyright Royalty Collection Practices, 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTs., No. 6, at 30
(1995).
Kathryn Michaelis
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE MAY BE CONVERTED INTO A GOVERNMENT
CORPORATION
On May 17, 1995, the Patent and Trademark Office Corporation Act of 1995
(H.R. 1659) was introduced into the House. H.R. 1659 would convert the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) from a regular government bureau in the De-
partment of Commerce to a "free-standing government corporation." Advantages
of the bill include expanded powers given to the Commissioner and the establish-
ment of two new boards. The PTO Corporation would also be granted more
authority over the granting of contracts, management over its property, and the
power to use and invest its own revenues. Proponents assert that incorporation
would enable the PTO to respond more efficiently to its customers as it would
have more flexibility in budgetary and other management areas. Specifically, the
PTO could use its revenues without apportionment by the Office of Management
and Budget. Currently, several million dollars of user fees paid into the patent
surcharge fund are withheld every year.
The Office of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks outlined its own
proposed alternative to H.R. 1659. The PTO administrative bill is similar to H.R.
1659, yet Commissioner Bruce Lehman notes that the PTO's proposal has some
noted differences. One difference is that the administrative bill gives oversight
authority to the Secretary of Commerce, with policy advisory authority to the
Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property. This is contrasted with
H.R. 1659, which would have the PTO unassociated with any governmental
department.
Despite Lehman's support, three intellectual property groups attacked the PTO
administrative proposal when testifying before the House on September 14, 1995.
One critique asserted that the PTO proposal to put policy matters in the hands of
an Undersecretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property "degrades" the pro-
posed position of CEO/commissioner - similar to the subservient role the PTO
played in the 1970's. Other critiques attacked the continued relationship between
the PTO and the Commerce Department, the lack of an advisory board, the fee-
setting authority of the Secretary of Commerce and appointment procedures of
the CEO. The three major intellectual property groups all favored the approach
taken in H.R. 1659. PTO Government Corporation Bill Introduced, 7 J. PROPRI-
ETARY RTS. No. 6, at 31 (1995); Administration Proposal on PTO Corp. Draws
Fire, 50 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1245, at 587 (Sept. 21,
1995).
Kathryn Michaelis
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No PIECEMEAL DmsIONS FOR CONCURRENT USE REGISTRATION OF
TRADEMARKS
On July 26, 1995, a U.S. court of appeals denied trademark registration of the
"Walking Fingers" logos for yellow pages directories. The court held that such
an applicant cannot divide up the country into regions where the mark is and is
not generic. Therefore, concurrent use registration of a logo for a claimed territo-
ry is not permitted when the logo is generic in a non-claimed territory. High-
lights, 50 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1239, at 339 (1995).
Kathryn Michaelis
RE-RELEASE OF DISNEY'S FANTASIA STIRS CONTROVERSY
Are rights that are acquired years and decades before the creation of the home
video industry broad enough to authorize the re-release of old movies on video?
The Southern District Court of New York recently addressed this in one of the
most litigated cases on this issue in Muller v. Walt Disney Co. Productions, 876
F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
In Muller, three lawsuits were brought against Disney for its 1991 release on
video and laser discs of the original (and not as popular) 1940 movie release.
The plaintiffs included the publisher of Igor Stravinsky's The Rite of Spring, the
Philadelphia Orchestra who performed the film's soundtrack music, and the
estate of Leopold Stokowski, the conductor of the Orchestra when Fantasia was
produced. Stravinsky's publisher claimed that the license, whereby Disney ac-
quired the right to use the composition of The Rite of Spring in the movie's
soundtrack, did not extend to its use on videocassette. The Orchestra's suit was
based on its entitlement to a share in the video profits as a matter of copyright,
contract, trademark and publicity law. The last suit was brought by the estate of
the conductor of the Orchestra, Stokowski, who entered into the original contract
with Disney in 1939.
Disney responded with its own suit against the Stokowski estate for indeni-
nification against liability in the orchestra's case, and claims for a right to setoff
for any payments required to be paid to the Orchestra or publisher. A federal
district court in New York City ruled against Disney on the indemnity claim. It
also ruled against Disney on the setoff claim, despite the fact that the suits
sought a total of more than one-hundred percent of Fantasia's home video prof-
its. Court Dismisses Disney's Claims for Implied Indemnity and Setoff Against
Stokowski Estate in Action Involving "Fantasia" Home-Videos, 17 ENT. L. REP.,
No. 3 (1995) (citing Muller v. Walt Disney Co. Productions, 876 F. Supp. 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
Kathryn Michaelis
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OWNERS COMMITTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
During the baseball strike of 1994-95, a federal district court in New York
1995]
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City found that major league baseball club owners were committing unfair labor
practices. In March of 1995, the Players Association and National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) asserted that the owners had violated section 8(a) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Under section 8(a), employers are required to bargain
collectively and in good faith with their employees concerning "mandatory"
subjects. However, bargaining is not required for subjects that are considered
"permissive." The violations of section 8(a) took place because the club owners
unilaterally eliminated (a) salary arbitration for reserved players; (b) competitive
bidding for free agents; and (c) the anti-collusion provision of the expired collec-
tive bargaining agreement before an impasse had been reached in collective
bargaining.
The club owners defended by alleging that these topics were permissive and
therefore, did not require collective bargaining. The court disagreed and ordered
the owners to restore the terms of the expired collective bargaining agreement.
This injunction prompted a suspension of the strike and a return to the field.
Court Ruled That NLRB Had Probable Cause To Believe That Major League
Baseball Owners Committed Unfair Labor Practices During Player Strike and
Temporary Injunction Was Issued, 17 ENT. L. REP., No. 3, August, 1995 (citing
Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, 880 F. Supp.
246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
Kathryn Michaelis
Ross PEROT OPPONENT NOT ALLOTTED EQUAL TIME
The Second Circuit upheld the FCC's ruling that Ross Perot's interview on
ABC was exempt from the "equal time" requirements of the Communications
Act of 1934. In June of 1992, Perot appeared on ABC when he was a then-unde-
clared candidate for President. Lenora B. Fulani, another independent candidate,
sought to appear on ABC as well, but the network denied her request. Subse-
quently, Fulani complained to the FCC because she was not given an equal op-
portunity to appear on ABC.
Under section 315(a) of the Act, when a broadcaster permits any "legally
qualified candidate for any public office" to use its station, the broadcaster also
must provide all other legally qualified candidates with an equal opportunity to
use its facilities. The statute exempts from this requirement four categories of
news events, including "bona fide news interviews." The court upheld the FCC's
ruling because it fit under this bonafide news interview exemption. Court Up-
holds FCC's Finding that Ross Perot Interview on ABC Was Exempt From
"Equal Time" Requirements, 17 ENT. L. REP., No. 3, Aug., 1995 (citing Fulani
v. FCC, 49 F.3d 904 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Kathryn Michaelis
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QUARTERBACK Is GIVEN PENALTY IN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CASE
In 1989 and 1990, when Joe Montana was leading the San Francisco 49ers to
the Super Bowl, the San Jose Mercury News capitalized on his fame. The News
featured a portrait of Montana on its cover and sold posters bearing the
quarterback's name and likeness. Montana sued for misappropriation. The News
defended on the grounds of First Amendment freedom of speech. The California
state appellate court agreed with the newspaper, stating, among other things, that
the success of the 49ers was the subject of public interest protected by the First
Amendment. It further found that the posters were entitled to First Amendment
protection because "Montana's name and likeness appeared in the posters for
precisely the same reason they appeared on the original newspaper front pages;
because Montana was a major player in contemporaneous newsworthy sports
events."
In reaching its decision, the appellate court looked to a similar case decided in
1975. This case was brought by professional quarterback Joe Namath against
Sports Illustrated when the magazine republished a photo of Namath that was
featured in other magazines as an advertisement for itself. As with Montana,
Namath also lost his case. The California Supreme Court has denied Montana's
petition for rehearing. Joe Montana Loses Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against San
Jose Mercury News Seeking Compensation For Newspaper's Sale Of Poster
Reproductions In Its Pages Bearing His Name and Likeness, 17 ENT. L. REP.,
No. 3, Aug., 1995 (citing Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal.
App. 4th 790, modified, 35 Cal. App. 4th 813 (1995)).
Kathryn Michaelis
WWF UNDER FIRE FROM FORMER WRESTLERICOMMENTATOR
Titan Sports, Inc., which operates The World Wrestling Federation (WWF),
was sued by former wrestler Jesse "The Body" Ventura, in December of 1991,
for recovery of royalties. Titan had entered into various licensing agreements for
the production of toys, t-shirts, trading cards, calendars, a computer game, videos
and other items that portrayed its WWF wrestlers. Ventura was the subject of
some of those videos.
Titan originally hired Ventura as a wrestler, but after injuries, Ventura became
a commentator for WWF from 1985 until 1990 under several different contracts.
No mention was made of Ventura's right to royalties from the videotapes of the
fights until 1987. In that year, Ventura signed a written contract that waived any
right to royalties.
On March 16, 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that Titan exploited Ventura's commentating performances and violated Ventu-
ra's right to publicity in the time period before the 1987 contract. For the period
involving the 1987 contract, the court held that Ventura was entitled to avoid the
fraudulently induced contract and to recover the reasonable value of the royalties.
The fraud claim was based upon the fact that Ventura and his agent had been
falsely informed that Ventura was not entitled to royalties because he was not a
7
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"featured performer" on the videotape. In fact, Titan had paid such royalties to
other "non-featured" performers. Relying on such misrepresentations, Ventura
was fraudulently induced into signing the 1987 contract, thereby foregoing his
right to royalties. Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25332
(8th Cir. Sept. 11, 1995).
Kathryn Michaelis
TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR VASELINE IMITATORS
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari of a petition for review of a Federal
Circuit ruling which held that private-label imitation products may mimic the
packaging of well known national brands without violating trademark law. This
case involved Vaseline Intensive Care Lotion (owned by Conopco) and a similar
hand lotion manufactured by a private label company who distributed its product
to Venture Stores. The private label company created a hand lotion to directly
compete with Vaseline's product. The private company developed a container
and label that mimicked the Vaseline packaging in shape and color, yet distin-
guished itself by having the black and white Venture logo displayed on the label.
The packaging of the product was intended to make it clear to the consumer that
the product is similar to the national brand and is intended for the same purpos-
es. The imitator's lotion even contained a red banner on its label inviting con-
sumers to "Compare to Vaseline Intensive Care."
The Federal Circuit held in favor of Venture Stores, finding that their private
label hand lotion did not infringe on Vaseline Intensive Care's trademark. The
court determined that this type of competition has become common and well
known in the marketplace. The court was strongly influenced by the fact that the
Venture logo was prominently situated on the front of the product and that cus-
tomers easily recognized the unique black and white Venture logo. The court
also noted that consumers were invited to compare the Venture brand to Vase-
line, thereby no actual or likelihood of confusion would arise between the two
products. Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1724 (1995).
Stacy Pappas
COPIES OF CIA REPORTS ARE THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPERTY
A former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee brought an action
against his former employer, alleging prior restraint. Every CIA document neces-
sitates CIA approval if it may contain, or be based upon, classified information
before it is released. The CIA refused to review the report, so the former em-
ployee sued.
The CIA employee drafted a report on the Bay of Pigs Operation and after
terminating his employment kept a copy of the report for his own personal pos-
session. The employee wanted to publish the report, so he asked the CIA to
review it and clear it for publication, which the government refused to do.
[Vol. VI: 177
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The employee argued that the Copyright Act of 1976 denies the Government
copyright protection. Since the Government has no copyright protection, it has no
exclusive right to reproduce its works, and therefore, the plaintiff argued that the
copy of the report in his possession was his. The D.C. Circuit agreed that the
Government generally cannot prevent the reproduction of its works (apart from
classified information), but "by no stretch of the interpretive imagination" does
the lack of copyright protection indicate that a copy of a government work can-
not be the Government's property. The former employee was ordered to return
the report because the court found it was the CIA's physical property, and ac-
cordingly, the CIA is entitled the right to possess its own property.
The court also rejected the former employee's argument that the CIA's refusal
to review the report was an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First
Amendment. The court held that since the employee had no right to the report,
the report was not his, and the First Amendment gives no general right of access
to government information. Pfeiffer v. CIA, 60 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Stacy Pappas
TRADE DRESS PROTECION FOR DICTIONARIES
In a case of trade dress infringement, the Second Circuit found that Random
House's Webster's College Dictionary did not infringe on the trade dress of its
competitor, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, published by Merriam-
Webster. The court found no likelihood of confusion between the dictionaries
even in light of the fact that both have red dust jackets and both display the
word "Webster" on the spine of their jackets. The court held that red is a stan-
dard color for dictionaries and therefore, not subject to protection. Additionally,
the court affirmed that the word "Webster" is generic in conjunction with dictio-
naries. The Second Circuit threw out the lower court's award of $2.2 million in
favor of Random House, and the U.S. Supreme court denied certiorari. Merriam-
Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1252 (1995).
Stacy Pappas
GATORADE To PAY $26.5 MILLION
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to reconsider a decision
awarding a record $26.5 million damage award against Quaker Oats, the maker
of Gatorade. Quaker Oats was sued, in 1984, by Sands, Taylor and Wood, a firm
that owned the federal registration for the trademark "Thirst-Aid" to be used in
conjunction with its goods - soda fountain syrups. After Quaker Oats launched
its nationally-televised commercial advertising campaign for "Gatorade is Thirst
Aid," Sands, Taylor and Wood sued. The damage award was reduced from the
original grant of $31.3 million and was based on a royalty rate (1% of the profits
for the first year of infringement, .5% for each successive year). The Seventh
Circuit took the royalty rate and doubled the figure, then added amounts for
19951
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prejudgment interest and attorney fees to ultimately arrive at the $26.5 million
total. Although the $26.5 million award was large, the court held that the award
was merely a deterrence and not a penalty in light of the fact that Quaker Oats
reaped $247.3 million dollars profit on Gatorade sales during the "Thirst-Aid"
campaign. Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 44 F.3d 579 (7th Cir.
1995).
Stacy Pappas
YouR MEMORY CAN VIOLATE THE TRADE SECRETS Acr
Former employees of Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. were enjoined from
conducting business with any Stampede customer due to their violation of the
Trade Secrets Act. The former employees left Stampede to form their own busi-
ness and recreated a copy of Stampede's customer list from memory. The Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's holding that using memory alone to
recreate information was sufficient to find a violation of confidential information.
In its analysis, the court held that the customer list was indeed a trade secret.
The list had been developed through a substantial amount of time, effort and
expense by Stampede, and was not readily available from any one public source,
as it was a compilation of several different sources. Also, Stampede protected its
customer lists using reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy and confidentiality,
such as allowing only a few employees computer access to the lists, keeping
hard copies of the lists in a locked office and daily checks of all garbage. Addi-
tionally, every job application stated that all information received on the job is
Stampede's property.
Since the court determined that the list was a trade secret, it looked next at
whether the former employees' act of reconstructing the customer lists by look-
ing at a map and remembering the former customers zone by zone, was misap-
propriation of the trade secrets. The list of customers was not physically removed
from Stampede, but the court decided that theft or conversion of the physical
document was not required to constitute misappropriation. It was enough that the
former employees intentionally memorized the lists. The court thus held that
using memorization to rebuild a trade secret does not transform that trade secret
from confidential into non-confidential information.
Finally, the former employees were enjoined from conducting business with
any Stampede customer for four years. The court limited its permanent injunction
to a term of four years because the average customer only remains in the indus-
try for three to five years and purchases goods from more than one warehouse.
Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209 (Il. App. Ct. 1995).
Stacy Pappas
PATENT VS. TRADEMARK: PATENT WINS
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit confronted the intersection of
the United States Patent Act and the Lanham Trademark Act. Vomado Air, Inc.
[Vol. VI: 177
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had a patent for the spiral structure in a household fan grill. Typically, after the
patent's expiration, Vomado's invention would pass into the public domain, but
here, after the patent expired, Vomado attempted to assert trade dress protection
of the grill. Although the grill would be eligible for trade dress protection be-
cause it was non-functional (meaning that enough alternative grill designs exist
so that other fan manufacturers could effectively compete without this design),
the court determined that not every non-functional configuration is eligible for
trade dress protection. The court created a test to determine if the invention
should enter into the public domain. The court held that where the product con-
figuration is the significant inventive component of an invention, so that without
the inventive component the invention cannot fairly be said to be the same ih-
vention, patent policy dictates that the invention enter into the public domain
when the patent expires. The court said that consumer confusion caused by copy-
ing patented configurations was, at best, a peripheral concern of section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. Accordingly, the invention was not given trade dress protection.
Vomado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Co., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 USLW 3271 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1995) (No. 95-
524).
Stacy Pappas
INCONTESTABILITY Is NOT ENOUGH FOR LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
In Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Virginia, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the incontestability of a trademark alone is not sufficient for a
finding of likelihood of confusion. Lone Star operated over thirty restaurants in
the United States and was the holder of the trademarks "Lone Star Cafe" and
"Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon," in conjunction with restaurants and clothing
items. Alpha began operation of its "Lone Star Grill" in regions where Lone
Star's restaurants already existed. By the time Alpha began its operation, the
Lone Star marks had become incontestable because they were in continuous and
unchallenged use for five years. The Fourth Circuit held that even though the
marks were incontestable, that alone was not enough to enjoin Alpha from its
infringing use of the terms "Lone Star."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Alpha had in-
fringed, but the Fourth Circuit applied its newly created two-pronged test for
trademark infringement and unfair competition: first, the mark must be protect-
ible, and second, the defendant's use of the mark must be likely to cause confu-
sion. The two-prong test replaced the analysis of the district court which found
infringement simply because the mark was incontestable.
The Fourth Circuit found that, under the new test, a likelihood of confusion
existed. It also affirmed the injunction granted by the district court, enjoining
Alpha from using the mark "Lone Star Grill" or any other mark containing the
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words "Lone Star" in association with restaurant services. Lone Star Steakhouse
& Saloon v. Alpha of Virginia, 43 F.3d 922 (4th Cir. 1995).
Stacy Pappas
SERIAL KILLER WAS NOT DEFAMED
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the author and publisher of an "encyclopedia of
serial killers" in a defamation suit raised by one of the encyclopedia's entries.
This defamation suit was brought by a convicted murderer, serving two concur-
rent life sentences, who objected to his inclusion in the author's book. The mur-
derer resented being labeled as a serial killer who was linked to the murders of
at least twenty women. The district court determined that the dictionary entry
was true. The plaintiff was convicted of two murders, and it was widely reported
that he was under investigation for additional murders based on police evidence
found in his mother's home - jewelry, women's clothing, human teeth, and
manuscripts which detailed ritualistic murders. As truth is a complete defense in
defamation cases, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed and the case
dismissed. Schaefer v. Newton, 57 F.3d 1073, reported in full, 23 Media L. Rep.
BNA (2051) (7th Cir. 1995).
Stacy Pappas
KKK FAILs IN THEIR PLANs To ADOPT
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that the KKK's First Amendment rights were not violated by Texas'
rejection of its application to participate in an adopt-a-highway program. The
KKK filed an application to adopt two miles of highway that runs directly in
front of and provides the primary entrance to a federally subsidized public hous-
ing project that has been under a continuing order of desegregation. The efforts
to desegregate the housing project have encountered strong opposition from the
KKK, including threats to the mayor that she'll hang in "black effigy," harassing
phone calls to tenants and numerous other acts of intimidation. As a member of
the highway adoption program, the Klan's duties would be to collect litter on its
portion of the highway. The State would then post signs naming the KKK at
both ends of the adopted highway miles as the "adopter."
In its decision, the court reasoned that Texas did not violate the KKK's free
speech rights because the program is a non-public forum, (assuming that par-
ticipation in the program would constitute speech or expressive conduct). Ther-
efore, the state may exclude the speech if it finds a reasonable argument to do
so. The court then held that Texas may reasonably argue that participation by the
Klan in the program would substantially impede that state's ability to comply
with the federal injunction requiring desegregation. Finally, the court held that
Texas' rejection of the Klan's application was not motivated by a desire to sup-
press the Klan's viewpoint or opinion, but rather resulted from the foreseeable
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impact the Klan would have on the peace and privacy of the project residents
and use of state highways. Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075,
rehearing en banc denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27497 (5th Cir. Aug. 24,
1995).
Stacy Pappas
CONGRESS CONSIDERING EXTENDING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The House of Representatives and Senate are considering legislation to extend
the term of copyright protection, which is currently author's life plus fifty years.
House Bill 989 and Senate Bill 483 seek to extend the term to author's life plus
seventy years. This increase would make American copyright protection uniform
with the new European Union standard. The European Union (EU) issued a
ruling that by July 1, 1995, each EU Member State is to provide copyright pro-
tection for a term of life plus seventy years; however, "the rule of shorter term,"
prohibiting protection of works from non-member EU states for this period, may
still apply unless that country also provides for a term of life plus seventy years.
According to Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks, passage of the extension bills may serve to
reaffirm the position of the United States as a world leader in copyright protec-
tion. Lehman also feels that extension of the copyright term will benefit the U.S.
trade balance and economy. In 1994, the United States copyright industry con-
tributed approximately $40 billion in foreign sales to the United States' econo-
my. A twenty year extension of copyright protections would further the United
States' trade balance. The proposed bills also seek to apply the term protection
retrospectively, adding twenty years to the renewal terms of copyrights in their
first term as of January 1, 1978. Copyright - Term Of Protection Harmonized
With European Union, LEXIS, Hot Topics Library, Intellectual Property Law
File, Aug. 4, 1995.
Ann Pantoga
LICENSING RIGHTS To PICASSO'S WORKS SETTLED
Disputes over the trademark and licensing rights to Picasso's works have been
settled in a federal court in Manhattan. Picasso died intestate in 1983 at the age
of 93. The controversy stems from a granddaughter's 1979 sale of reproduction
and licensing rights of 109 of his works. Under the settlement agreement,
Picasso's estate owns the copyright and trademarks, while the six defendants
have the exclusive right to market a portion of Picasso posters and prints. Pursu-
ant to the settlement, after July 1, 1998, the estate will join with the defendants
and market its own share of the posters and prints. Another defendant agreed to
be the only licensee of the Marina Picasso Collection, 234 Picasso images. Other
lawsuits in Florida and California are still pending. Margaret A. Jacobs, Picasso
Estate Settles Suits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1995, at B5; Frances A. McMorris,
1995]
13
Michaelis et al.: Epilogue
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
Picasso's Heirs Fight To Control Use Of His Name, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
1994, at Bi.
Ann Pantoga
Do COPYCAT GOLF COURsEs VIOLATE TRADEMARK LAWS?
Pinehurst Resort and Country Club of North Carolina, Harbour Town of
South Carolina and Pebble Beach Golf Links of California are suing a Houston
company, Tour 18, for trademark infringement in U.S. District Court in Houston.
Tour 18's three year old golf course in Humble, Texas, north of Houston, is at
the heart of the lawsuit. Tour 18, which manages several golf courses, advertises
that each of its courses recreates famous holes from golf courses on the Profes-
sional Golf Association (PGA) tour. The plaintiffs contend that Tour 18 should
not profit from the respected holes' reputation. The suit claims that Tour 18 is
unfairly trading on the names of the famous courses, "with the intent to trade on
or derive benefit from the commercial value reputation and goodwill associated
therewith." In addition, the suit claims that Tour 18 is guilty of false advertising.
The plaintiffs seek to prevent Tour 18 from utilizing course designs that replicate
the original holes created by the various plaintiffs. In addition, the plaintiffs want
to prohibit Tour 18 from claiming that its holes are copies of their holes, and
they want Tour 18 to pay treble the amount of profits they have received from
the use of plaintiffs' names. Tour 18 has filed a countersuit for more than $20
million, claiming the plaintiffs' lawsuit has delayed expansion of its own courses.
Tour 18's duplication of courses include the third hole at Pinehurst No. 2, the
eighth at Shinnecock Hills in Southhampton, N.Y. and the famous three-hole
"Amen Comer" at Augusta National in Augusta, Georgia. Tour 18 has duplicated
the holes even to the point of the placing of dogwoods and azaleas. Each hole
provides the history of its famous original. In addition, each hole provides a
disclaimer stating that the PGA courses are not affiliated with the Humble
course, and that the PGA did not authorize any such imitation of its courses.
The issue presented in this case is whether it is illegal for Tour 18 to repro-
duce the exact design and layout of some of the world's most famous golf cours-
es. Under federal law, words, names and product designs or shapes are eligible
for trademark protection. These laws are intended to decrease consumer confu-
sion. However, in this case, user confusion may be difficult for the plaintiffs to
prove. Tour 18 contends that its disclaimers at each hole alleviate any miscon-
ception that these are the original holes. Tour 18 also claims that it lawfully
purchased the topography maps of the plaintiffs' famous courses and that the de-
signs were not copyrighted until three years after the purchase, after the maps
were already being used. Furthermore, Tour 18 claims that many of the golfers
at its courses cannot afford to play the famous courses although professional
golfers familiar with the famous courses can see the differences between the
holes.
Owners of other replicated golf course holes are awaiting the determination of
this suit. Golf, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 3, 1995, at E2; Deborah Tedford,
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Golf Trademark Infringement Case Goes On Trial Here Tuesday, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 30, 1995, at A13; Deborah Tedford, Poll Shows Some Confuse
Golf Courses, Lawyers Say; Tour 18 Recreates Some Famous Holes, HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 1, 1995, at A20.
Ann Pantoga
THE SUPREME COURT GRAPPLES WITH SOFrWARE TECHNOLOGY
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to IBM's Lotus Devel-
opment Corporation in its copyright infringement suit against Borland, Interna-
tional. The Unites States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed a lower
court's ruling that Borland's spreadsheets, Quattro and Quattro Pro, infringed the
copyright of Lotus' spreadsheet, Lotus 1-2-3. The court of appeals held that a
computer program's menu command hierarchy, which provides means for users
to control and operate the program, is a "method of operation" excluded from
copyright protection by the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) because that statute
states basic commands for running a program are considered a "procedure, pro-
cess, system [or] method of operation" and cannot be copyrighted. The menus
list text commands to make the software move material around, create a spread-
sheet, print or handle other functions. Lotus argued that its command menus are
a form of creative expression by its designers, and therefore fall under copyright
protection.
For the first time, the Supreme Court will examine how federal copyright law
applies to computer software programs. Katharine Stalter, Lotus Wins Chance to
Appeal Copyright Ruling, DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 28, 1995, at 17.
Ann Pantoga
FCC REPEALS PRIME TIME RULE
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has repealed the twenty-five
year old Prime Time Access Rule, established in 1970 to increase competition
and reduce domination in the television business. According to this rule, net-
works that offered fifteen hours of prime time programming per week were
limited to only three hours of broadcasting per day during those prime hours.
In repealing the Rule, the FCC stated it felt that since today's network com-
petition is quite healthy, there is no longer any fear that the three major networks
will control the broadcast business. The introduction of cable television and the
increase in independent stations has provided for a wide choice in programming,
negating the need for this type of regulation. FCC Repeals Prime Time Access
Rule, So That ABC, CBS and NBC Affiliates Will Be Able To Broadcast Network
Programming During Prime Time Viewing Hours, ENT. L. REP., Oct., 1995, Vol.
17, No. 5.
Ann Pantoga
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